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Abstract
Probabilistic password strength meters have been proved to be
the most accurate tools to measure password strength. Unfor-
tunately, by construction, they are limited to solely produce an
opaque security estimation that fails to fully support the user
during the password composition. In the present work, we
move the first steps towards cracking the intelligibility barrier
of this compelling class of meters. We show that probabilistic
password meters inherently own the capability of describing
the latent relation occurring between password strength and
password structure. In our approach, the security contribu-
tion of each character composing a password is disentangled
and used to provide explicit fine-grained feedback for the
user. Furthermore, unlike existing heuristic constructions, our
method is free from any human bias, and, more importantly,
its feedback has a clear probabilistic interpretation.
In our contribution: (1) we formulate the theoretical founda-
tions of interpretable probabilistic password strength meters;
(2) we describe how they can be implemented via an effi-
cient and lightweight deep learning framework suitable for
client-side operability.
1 Introduction
Accurately measuring password strength is essential to
guarantee the security of password-based authentication
systems. However, even more critical, is training users to
select secure passwords in the first place. One common
approach is to rely on password policies that list a series
of requirements for a strong password. This approach is
limited or even harmful [12]. Alternatively, Passwords
Strength Meters (PSMs) have been shown to be useful
and are witnessing increasing adoption in commercial
solutions [17, 30].
The first instantiations of PSMs were based on simple
heuristic constructions. Password strength was estimated
via either handcrafted features such as LUDS (which counts
lower and uppercase letters, digits, and symbols) or heuristic
Change this
i a m s e c u r e !
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i a M s e c u r e !
Change this
i a M s e c u r E !
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i 0 M s e c $ r E !
Figure 1: Example of the character-level feedback mechanism
and password composition process induced by our meter. In
the figure, “iamsecure!“ is the password initially chosen by
the user. Colors indicate the estimated character security: red
(insecure)→ green (secure). Please refer to the color version
of the paper for a better illustration.
entropy definitions. Unavoidably, given their heuristic nature,
this class of PSMs failed to accurately measure password
security [13, 34].
More recently, thanks to an active academic interest,
PSMs based on more sound constructions and rigorous
security definitions have been proposed. In the last decade,
indeed, a considerable research effort gave rise to more
precise meters capable of accurately measuring password
strength [11, 24, 32].
However, meters have also become proportionally more
opaque and inherently hard to interpret due to the increasing
complexity of the employed approaches. State-of-art solutions
base their estimates on blackbox parametric probabilistic
models [11, 24] that leave no room for interpretation of
the evaluated passwords; they do not provide any feedback
to users on what is wrong with their password or how to
improve it. We advocate for explainable approaches in
password meters, where users receive additional insights
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and become cognizant of which parts of their passwords
could straightforwardly improve. This makes the password
selection process less painful since users can keep their
passwords of choice mostly unchanged while ensuring they
are secure.
In the present work, we show that the same rigorous proba-
bilistic framework capable of accurately measuring password
strength can also fundamentally describe the relation between
password security and password structure. By rethinking the
underlying mass estimation process, we create the first in-
terpretable probabilistic password strength meter. Here, the
password probability measured by our meter can be decom-
posed and used to estimate further the strength of every single
character of the password. This explainable approach allows
us to assign a security score to each atomic component of
the password and determine its contribution to the overall
security strength. This evaluation is, in turn, returned to the
users who can tweak a few "weak" characters and keep their
favorite passwords essentially unchanged. Figure 1 illustrates
the selection process.
In devising the proposed mass estimation process, we found
it ideally suited for being implemented via a deep learning
architecture. In the paper, we show how that can be cast as
an efficient client-side meter employing deep convolutional
neural networks. The major contributions of our work are:
(i) We formulate a novel password probability estimation
framework based on undirected probabilistic models. (ii) We
show that such a framework can be used to build a precise and
sound password feedback mechanism. (iii) We implement the
proposed meter via an efficient and lightweight deep learning
framework ideally suited for client-side operability.
2 Background and preliminaries
In this section, we offer an overview of the fundamental con-
cepts that are important to understand our contribution. Sec-
tion 2.1 covers Probabilistic Password Strength Meters. Sec-
tion 2.2 glances neural networks and related topics. Next, in
Section 2.3, we cover structured probabilistic models that will
be fundamental in the interpretation of our approach. Finally,
Section 2.4 briefly discusses relevant previous works within
the PSMs context.
2.1 Probabilistic Password Strength Meters
Probabilistic password strength meters (PPSMs) are PSMs
that base their strength measure on an explicit estimate of
password probability. In the process, they resort to probabilis-
tic models to approximate the probability distribution behind
a set of known passwords, typically, instances of a password
leak. Having an approximation of the mass function, strength
estimation is then derived by leveraging adversarial reasoning.
Here, password robustness is estimated in consideration of
an attacker who knows the underlying password distribution,
and that aims at minimizing the guess entropy [23] of his/her
guessing attack. To that purpose, the attacker performs an op-
timal guessing attack, where guesses are issued in decreasing
probability order (i.e., high-probability passwords first). More
formally, given a probability mass function P(x) defined on
the key-space X, the attacker creates an ordering XP(x) of X
such that:
XP(x) = [x0,x1, . . . ,xn] where ∀i∈[0,n] : P(xi)≥ P(xi+1) .
(1)
During the attack, the adversary produces guesses by travers-
ing the list XP(x). Under this adversarial model, passwords
with high probability are considered weak, as they will be
quickly guessed. Low-probability passwords, instead, are as-
sessed as secure, as they will be matched by the attacker only
after a considerable, possibly not feasible, number of guesses.
2.2 Neural Networks
A neural network is a differentiable, non-linear1, function
f (· | θ) defined over a family of parametric functions indexed
by the set of parameters/weights θ of the network. The fam-
ily of functions is defined by the so-called architecture of
the network that is specified as a sequence of logic partitions
called layers i.e., non-linear parametric functions on their own.
Deep neural networks, in turn, are functions defined by the
composition of many layers.
Deep neural networks are a powerful function approxima-
tor capable of accurately describe relations among high-
dimensional spaces. Chosen a target function, a differentiable
loss function is defined and used to guide the approximation.
This process, often named learning, consists in finding the
configuration of parameters θ that minimize the discrepancy
between the target function and the neural network by relying
on a gradient-descent-based optimization technique.
Furthermore, deep neural networks have vastly demonstrated
the peculiar capability of generalizing over the input domain.
This mainly relates to the smoothness of the data represen-
tation learned during the training [9]. Such generalization is
particularly useful within the context of passwords meters, as
it helps a correct evaluation of unobserved passwords.
Our meter is implemented via a Convolutional Neural Net-
work (CNN); that is, a network formed from convolutional
layers. A convolutional layer is a neural layer that exhibits
an infinitely strong bias over its weights; it leverages spatial
parameters sharing to both reduce the number of learnable
parameters of the networks2 and enforce spatial invariance
over the input domain which can further help generalization.
In particular, we chose a family of architectures called resid-
ual neural networks [19] (or resnet in brief). A resnet is
1Linear neural networks are possible, but they are typically less interesting
than the non-linear ones.
2 This property allows the construction of deep architectures with a
limited memory fingerprint.
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generally composed of a block of layers presenting skipping
connections among them; that is, layers that are not adja-
cent can be connected via an additional connection. Residual
skipping connections have been proven to improve both the
gradient flow and the depth/accuracy ratio of networks [19].
2.3 Structured Probabilistic Models
Very often, the probabilistic models used by PPSMs are prob-
abilistic structured models (even known as graphical mod-
els). Those describe password distributions by leveraging
a graph notation to illustrate the conditional dependencies
among a set of random variables. Here, a random variable xi
is depicted as a vertex, and an edge between xi and x j exists
whether xi and x j are statistically dependent. Structured prob-
abilistic models are classified according to the orientation
of edges. A direct acyclic graph (DAG) defines a directed
graphical model (or Bayesian Network). In such formal-
ism, an edge asserts a cause-effect relationship between two
variables; that is, the state assumed from the variable xi is in-
tended as a direct consequence of those assumed by its parents
par(xi) in the graph. Under such a description, a topological
ordering among all the random variables can be asserted and
used to factorize the joint probability distribution of the ran-
dom variables effectively. An undirected graph, on the other
hand, defines an undirected graphical model, also known as
Markov Random Field (MRF). In this description, the causal-
ity interpretation of edges is relaxed, and connected variables
influence each other symmetrically. Undirected models per-
mit the formalization of stochastic processes where causality
among factors cannot be asserted. However, this comes at the
cost of losing easy factorization of the joint distribution.
Generally speaking, in defining a structured model, the de-
signer can introduce arbitrary prior knowledge in the descrip-
tion of the stochastic process. That is, independence among
random variables can be asserted a priori and used to simplify
the learning process. Such independence assertions can serve
to reduce the number of parameters of the model drastically,
and, whether verified in practice, they can help to represent
the target distribution better.
2.4 Related Works
Here, we briefly review early approaches to the definition of
PSMs. We limit the discussion to the most influence works as
well as to the ones most related to ours.
Probabilistic PSMs: Originally thought for guessing at-
tacks [25], Markov model approaches have found natural ap-
plication in the password strength estimation context. Castel-
luccia et al. [11] use a stationary, finite state Markov chain
as a direct password mass estimator. Their model computes
the joint probability by separately measuring the conditional
probability of each pair of n-grams in the observed passwords.
In particular, the model learns a n-gram concurrence matrix
directly from the passwords chosen by users of the service.
In order to avoid information leaks, the estimation process is
performed purely server-side. Additionally, differential pri-
vacy is applied to the matrix.
Melicher et al. [24] extended the Markov model approach
by leveraging a character/token level Recurrent Neural Net-
work (RNN) for modeling the probability of passwords. In the
process, no n-markovian property is assumed. Their model
is implemented and carefully optimized to be a client-side
meter. Given the recurrent nature of the neural network, the
probability estimation process requires a number of network
inferences linear in the number of characters in the passwords.
Our approach requires the same number of network infer-
ences, but these can be parallelized at batch level.
As discussed in the Introduction, probabilistic approaches are
not capable of any natural form of feedback. In order to par-
tial cope with this shortcoming, a hybrid approach has been
investigated in [28]. Here, the model of Melicher et al. [24]
is aggregated with a series of 21 heuristic hand-crafted feed-
back mechanisms such as detection and reporting of leeting
behaviors or common tokens (e.g., keyboard walks).
Even if harnessing a consistently different form of feedback,
our framework merges these solutions into a single and jointly
learned model. Additionally, in contrast with [28], our feed-
back has a concrete probabilistic interpretation as well as a
complete freedom from any form of human bias. Interest-
ingly enough, our model autonomously learns some of the
heuristics hardwired in [28]. For instance, our model learned
that capitalizing characters in the middle of the string can
consistently improve password strength.
Token look-up PSMs: Another relevant class of meters
are those based on the token look-up approach. Generally
speaking, these are non-parametric solutions that base their
strength estimation on collections of sorted lists of tokens
like leaked passwords and word dictionaries. Here, a pass-
word is modeled as a combination of tokens and the relative
security score is derived from the ranking of the tokens in
the known dictionaries. Unlike probabilistic solutions, token-
based PSMs are able to return feedback to the user such as
explanation for the weakness of a password or hints on how
to improve it. Such feedback is mainly based on the semantic
attributed to the tokens composing the password. A leading
member of token look-up meters is zxcvbn [35], a client-side
password strength meter based on a token look-up / pattern
matching paradigm. It assumes every password as produced
from a template obtained by the concatenation of different
pre-defined patterns. For each pattern (i.e., token, reversed,
sequence repeat, keyboard and date) a list of candidate strings
is maintained. These are sorted in decreasing order of proba-
bility and used to model the attacker’s guessing strategy. The
meter scores passwords basing on a heuristic characterization
of the guess-number [23]. This score is described as the num-
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ber of combinations of tokens necessary to match the tested
password by traversing the sorted pattern lists. As above men-
tioned, zxcvbn is able to provide a consistent feedback to the
user; when a weak password is detected, the meter outputs a
motivation for the believed weakness of the password based
on the semantics of the tokens composing the password. For
instance, if one of the identified token lies in the "repeat"
list, zxcvbn will suggest the user to avoid the use of repeated
characters in the password. Naturally, this kind of feedback
mechanism inherently lacks of generality and address just few
human-chosen scenarios.
zxcvbn is available through a lightweight implementation.
As discussed from the authors themselves, zxcvbn suffers
from various limitations. By assumption, it is unable to model
the relation among different patterns occurring in the same
passwords. Additionally, like other token look-up based ap-
proaches, it fails to coherently model unobserved patterns and
tokens.
Another example of token look-up approach is the one pro-
posed in [21]. Telepathwords discourages a user to choose
weak passwords predicting the next most probable characters
during the password typing. In particular, predicted charac-
ters are shown to the user in order to dissuade him/her from
choosing them as next characters in the password. These are
reported together with an explanation of why those characters
were predicted. As for zxcvbn, such feedback solely accounts
for hardwired scenarios. For instance, the use of profanity in
the password. Telepathwords is server side only.
3 Meter foundations
In this section, we introduce the theoretical foundations of the
proposed estimation process as well as of the character-level
feedback mechanism deriving from it. First, in Section 3.1,
we introduce and motivate the probabilistic character-level
feedback mechanism. Later, in Section 3.2, we describe how
that can be obtained using undirected probabilistic models.
3.1 Character-level strength estimation via
probabilistic reasoning
As introduced in Section 2.1, PPSMs employ probabilistic
models to approximate the probability mass function of
an observed password distribution, say P(x). Estimating
P(x), however, could be particularly challenging and suitable
estimation techniques must be adopted in order to make
the process feasible. In this direction, a general solution
is to factorize the domain of the mass function (i.e., the
key-space); that is, passwords are modeled as concatenation
of smaller factors, typically, decomposed at character level.3
Afterwards, password distribution is estimated by modeling
stochastic interactions among these simpler components.
3Also n-grams or words segmentation are common.
More formally, every password is assumed as a realization
x= [x1, . . . ,x`] of a random vector of the kind x= [x1, . . . ,x`],
where each disjoint random variable xi represents the
character at position i in the string. Then, P(x) is described
by means of structured probabilistic models that formalize
the relations among those random variables, eventually
defining a joint probability distribution. In the process,
every random variable is associated with a local conditional
probability distribution (here, referred as Q) that describes
the stochastic behavior of xi in consideration of the condi-
tional independence properties asserted from the underlying
structured model i.e., Q(xi)=P(xi | par(xi)). Eventually,
the joint measurement of probability is derived from the
aggregation of the marginalized local conditional probability
distributions, typically under the form P(x)=∏`i=1 Q(xi=xi).
For instance, the Markov model approach [11, 25] factorizes
the joint probability as P(x)=∏`i=1 P(xi|xi−n, . . . ,xi−1),
where n is the order of the believed Markov property.
As introduced in Section 2.1, the joint probability
can be employed as a good proxy for password strength.
However, such a global assessment unavoidably hides much
fine-grained information that can be extremely valuable to
the interests of a password meter. In particular, the joint
probability offers us an atomic interpretation of the password
strength, but it fails at disentangling the relation between
password strength and password structure. That is, it does not
clarify which factors of an evaluated password are making
that password insecure. However, as widely demonstrated by
non-probabilistic approaches [21, 28, 35], users benefit from
the awareness of which part of the chosen password is easily
predictable and which is not. In this direction, we argue that
the local conditional probabilities that naturally appear
in the estimation of the joint one, if correctly shaped, can
offer detailed insights into the strength or the weakness of
each factor of a password. Such character-level probability
assignments are an explicit interpretation of the relation
between the structure of a password and its security. The
main intuition here is that: high values of Q(xi) tell us that xi
(i.e., character at position i in the string) has a high impact on
increasing the password probability and must be changed to
make the password stronger. Characters with low conditional
probability, instead, are pushing the password to have low
probability and must be maintained unchanged. Figure 2
reports some visual representations of such probabilistic
reasoning. In the figures, the background color of each
segment renders the value of the local conditional probability
of the character. Red describes high probability values,
whereas green describes low probability assignments. This
fine-grained estimation can be used as a sound guide for the
user at composition time, taking the form of active feedback.
Such a mechanism can naturally figure out weak passwords
components and explicitly guide the user to change them.
For instance, the local conditional probabilities can spot the
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f y x 1 2 3 z v w
e q y j ! @ # $ %
(a) Common tokens detection.
q w e r t y !
q w e ! r t y
S e c u r e 1
s E c u e 1
(b) Capitalize first/inner.
l e t m e i n 2
l e t m e 2 i n
(c) Numeric last/inner.
q w e r t y !
q w e ! r t y
(d) Special last/inner.
Figure 2: Panel (a) depicts the output of our meter for two examples of password presenting predictable tokens (i.e., “123“
and “!@#$%“). Here, the model automatically highlights the presence of weak substrings by assigning high probabilities to the
characters composing them. Panels (b), (c) and (d) are examples of self-learned weak/strong password composition patterns. In
panel (b), the model assigns high probability to the capitalization of the first letter i.e., ’S’ (common practice), whereas it assigns
low probability when the capitalization is performed on inner characters; ’E’ in the example (uncommon practice). Similar
results are shown for numeric and special characters in Panel (c) and (d) respectively.
presence of predictable tokens in the password without the
explicit use of dictionaries (Figure 2a). These measurements
are able to automatically describe common password patterns
like those manually modeled from other approaches [28], see
Figures 2b, 2c and 2d. More importantly, they can potentially
describe latent composition patterns that have never been
observed and modeled by human beings. In doing this,
neither supervision nor human-reasoning is required.
Unfortunately, existing PPSMs, by construction, leverage
arbitrary designed structured probabilistic models that fail to
produce the required estimates. Those assume independence
properties and causality relations among characters that are
not strictly verified in practice. As a result, their conditional
probability measurements fail to model correctly a coherent
character-level estimation that can be used to provide the
required feedback mechanism.
Hereafter, we show that relaxing these biases from the mass
estimation process will allow us to implement the feedback
mechanism described above. To that purpose, we have to build
a new probabilistic estimation framework based on complete
and undirected models.
3.2 An undirected description of password
distribution
To simplify the understanding of our method, we start with
a description of the probabilistic reasoning of previous ap-
proaches. Then, we fully motivate our solution by comparison
with them. In particular, for the comparison, we chose the
state-of-the-art neural approach proposed in [24] (henceforth,
referred as FLA) as a representative instance, since it is the
least biased as well as the most accurate among the existing
PPSMs.
FLA uses a recurrent neural network (RNN) to estimate
password mass at the character level. That model assumes a
stochastic process represented by a Bayesian network like the
one depicted in Figure 3a. As previously anticipated, such a
density estimation process bears the burden of bold assump-
tions on its formalization. Namely, the description derived
from a Bayesian Network implies the existence of (1) a causal-
x1
x2
x3 x4
(a)
x1
x2
x3
x4
(b)
Figure 3: Two graphical models describing different interpre-
tations of the generative probability distribution for passwords
of length four. Graph (a) represents the Bayesian network as-
sumed in [24]. Scheme (b) depicts the Markov Random Field
assumed by our estimation process.
ity order and (2) forward independence among password char-
acters. The first assumed property asserts that the causality
flows in a single and specific direction in the generative pro-
cess i.e., from the start of the string to its end. Therefore,
characters influence their probabilities only asymmetrically;
that is, the probability of xi+1 is conditioned from xi but not
vice versa. In practice, this implies that the observation of
the value assumed from xi+1 does not affect our belief in the
value expected from xi, yet the opposite does. In a similar
way, the second believed property - forward independence -
asserts that a character xi is independent from the characters
that follow it in the string i.e., [xi+1, . . . ,x`].
Assuming that the underlying stochastic process verifies
these properties eventually simplifies the estimation of
both the single local conditional probabilities and the
joint one. In particular, the local conditional probability
of each character can be computed as Q(xi) = P(xi |
x1, . . . ,xi−1), where Q(xi) explicate that the i’th charac-
ter solely depends on the characters that precede it in
the string. Just as easily, the joint probability factorizes
in: P(x) = ∏`i=1 Q(xi) = P(x1)∏
`
i=2 P(xi | x1, . . .xi−1)
by chain rule.
Unfortunately, although those assumptions do simplify
the estimation process, the conditional probability Q(xi),
per se, fails in giving a direct and coherent estimation
of the security contribution of the single character in the
password. This is particularly true for characters in the first
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positions of the string up to the point that the first character,
i.e., x1, is assumed to be independent of any other symbol
in the password; its probability is the same for any possible
configuration of the remaining random variables [x2, . . . ,x`].
Yet, in the context of a sound character-level feedback
mechanism, the symbol xi must be defined as “weak” or
“strong” strictly according to the context defined by the entire
string. For instance, given two passwords y=“aaaaaaa“
and z=“a######“, the probability Q(x1=’a’) should be
different if measured on y or z. More precisely, we expect
Q(x1=’a’|y) to be much higher than Q(x1=’a’|z), as ob-
serving y2,7=“aaaaaa“ drastically changes our expectations
about the possible values assumed from the first character
in the string. On the other hand, observing z2,7=“######“
tells us no much about the event x1=’a’. Yet, this interaction
cannot be described through the Bayesian network reported
in Figure 3a, where Q(x1=’a’|y) eventually results equal to
Q(x1=’a’|z). The same reasoning applies to trickier cases.
For instance, the password x=“(password)“. Here, arguably,
the security contribution of the first character ’(’ strongly
depends from the presence or absence of the last character4
i.e., x7=’)’. The symbol x1=’(’, indeed, can be either a good
choice (as it introduces entropy in the password) or a poor
one (as it implies a predictable template in the password),
but this solely depends on the value assumed from another
character in the string (the last one in this example). We argue
that a good meter should be able to model similar templates
and encourage the user to break them at composition time
(e.g., by advising the user to remove the first or the last
bracket). Yet, again, such relation is a priori excluded from
existing structured models.
It should be apparent that the assumed structural indepen-
dence prevents the resulting local conditional probabilities
from being sound descriptors of the real character probability
as well as of their security contribution. Consequently, such
measures cannot be used to build the fine-grained feedback
mechanism suggested in Section 3.1. The same identical
conclusion applies to other class of PPSMs [11, 33] which
add even more structural biases on top of those illustrated by
the model in Figure 3a.
Under a broader view, directed models are intended to be
used in contexts where the causality relationships among ran-
dom variables can be fully understood. Unfortunately, even
if passwords are physically written character after character
by the users, it is not possible to assert neither independence
nor cause-effect relations among the symbols that compose
them. Differently from plain dictionary words, passwords
are built on top of much more complex structures and
articulated interactions among characters that cannot be
fully described without relaxing many of the assumptions
leveraged by existing PPSMs. In the act of relaxing such as-
4Even if not so common, strings enclosed among brackets or other special
characters often appear in password leaks.
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Figure 4: Estimated local conditional probabilities for two
pairs of passwords. The numbers depicted above the strings
report the Q(xi) value for each character (rounding applied).
sumptions, we base our estimation on an undirected and
complete5 graphical model, as this represents the most gen-
eral description of the password generative distribution. That
is, neither independence nor causality among random vari-
ables are a priori implied. Figure 3b depicts the respective
Markov Random Field (MRF) for passwords of length four.
According to that description, the probability of the character
xi directly depends on any other character in the string i.e., the
full context. In other words, we model each variable xi as a
stochastic function of all the others. This intuition is better
captured from the consequent evaluation of local conditional
probability (Eq. 2).
Q(xi) =

P(xi | xi+1, . . .x`) i = 1
P(xi | x1, . . .xi−1) i = `
P(xi | x1, . . . ,xi−1,xi+1, . . .x`) 1< i< ` .
(2)
The measurement Q asserts that the probability of a charac-
ter is potentially influenced by the configuration of all the
other nodes in the graph. Nevertheless, if needed, indepen-
dence or causality relations can be autonomously ascribed as
context-specific independence6 from the probabilistic model
itself. That is, the model is free to capture independence from
the observed data and assert them as true at inference time.
Henceforth, we use the notation Q(xi) to refer to the local con-
ditional distribution of the i’th character given the password
x. When x is not clear from the context, we write Q(xi | x)
to make it explicit. The notation Q(xi=s) or Q(s), instead,
refers to the marginalization of the distribution according to
the symbol s.
Eventually, such undirected formalization intrinsically
weeds out all the limitations observed for the previous
estimation process (i.e., the Bayesian network in Figure 3a).
Now, every local measurement is computed within the
context offered by any other symbol in the string. Therefore,
relations that were previously assessed as impossible can
be naturally described. This statement becomes apparent
as soon as we reconsider the examples made above in the
5"Complete" in the graph theory sense.
6Independence that is verified only in case of specific configurations of
the random variables.
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discussion. In the example, y=“aaaaaaa“ / z=“a######“,
indeed, the local conditional probability of the first character
can be now backward-influenced from the context offered
from the subsequent part of the string. This is clearly
observable from the output of an instance of our meter
(whose implementation is discussed in Section 4) reported in
Figure 4a, where the value of Q(x1=’a’) drastically varies
between the two cases, i.e., y and z. As expected, we have
Q(x1=’a’|y)  Q(x1=’a’|z) verified in the example. A
similar intuitive result is reported in the right column of
Figure 4b, where the example x=“(password)“ is considered.
Here, the meter first scores the string x′=“(password“ then
scores the complete password x=“(password)“. In this
case, we expect that the presence of the last character ’)’
would consistently influence the conditional measurement of
the first bracket in the string. Such expectation is perfectly
captured from the reported output, where appending at the
end of the string the symbol ’)’ increases the probability of
the first bracket of a factor ∼ 15.
However, obtaining these improvements does not come for
free. Indeed, under the MRF construction, the productory over
the local conditional probabilities (better defined as potential
functions or factors within this context) does not strictly lead
to the joint probability distribution of x. Instead, such product
results in a unnormalized version of it shown in Equation 3.
P(x) ∝
`
∏
i=1
Q(xi) = P˜(x) and P(x) =
P˜(x)
Z
. (3)
In the equation, Z is the untractable partition function. This
result follows from the Hammersley–Clifford theorem [20],
as our conditional measurements (i.e., Q(xi)) are strictly non-
negative (more information about those will be given in Sec-
tion 4). Nevertheless, the unnormalized joint distribution pre-
serves the core properties needed to the meter functionality.
Most importantly, we have that:
∀x,x′ : P(x)≥ P(x′)⇔ P˜(x)≥ P˜(x′) .
That is, if we sort a list of guesses according to the true joint
P(x) or according to the unnormalized version P˜(x), we ob-
tain the same identical ordering. Consequently, no deviation
from the adversarial interpretation of PPSMs described in
Section 2.1 is implied. Indeed, we have XP(x) = XP˜(x) for
every password distribution, key-space and suitable sorting
function. Furthermore, the joint probability distribution, if
needed, can be approximated using suitable approximation
methods, as discussed in Section 9 reported in the Appendix.
A more detailed analysis of the probabilistic description of
our meter is reported in section 8 in Appendix.
3.2.1 Details on the password feedback mechanism
Joint probability can be understood as a compatibility score
assigned to a specific configuration of the MRF; it tells us
Table 1: First seven entries of the ordering imposed on Σ from
the local conditional distribution for each character of the
password x=“PaSsW0rD!“
Rank •aSsW0rD! P•SsW0rD! Pa•sW0rD! PaS•W0rD! PaSs•0rD! PaSsW•rD! PaSsW0•D! PaSsW0r•! PaSsW0rD•
0 {P} A s S w O R d 1
1 S {a} {S} {s} {W} o {r} {D} S
2 p @ c A # {0} N t 2
3 B 3 n T f I 0 m s
4 C 4 t E k i L l 3
5 M I d H 1 # D k {!}
6 1 1 r O F A n e 5
7 c 5 x $ 3 @ X r 9
8 s 0 $ I 0 ) S f 4
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
the likelihood of observing a sequence of characters during
the interaction with the password generative process. On a
smaller scale, a local conditional probability measures the
impact that a single character has in the final security score.
Namely, it tells us how much the character contributes at
the probability of observing a certain password x. Within
this interpretation, low-probabilities characters push the joint
of x to be closer to zero (secure), whereas high-probability
characters (i.e., Q(x1) . 1) offer almost no contribute at
lowering password probability (insecure). Therefore, users
can strengthen their candidate passwords by substituting
high-probability characters with suitable lower-probability
ones (e.g., Figure 1).
Unfortunately, users’ perception of password security has
been shown to diverge from the real one [29], and, without an
explicit guide, it would be difficult for them to select suitable
lower-probability substitutes. To address this limitation, one
can ascribe an additional mechanism capable of suggesting
secure substitute symbols to the users. Interestingly, our
local conditional distributions are naturally suitable to that
purpose. Indeed, ∀iQ(xi) are able to clarify which symbol
is a secure substitute and which is not for each character
xi of x. In particular, a distribution Q(xi), defined on the
whole alphabet Σ, assigns a probability to every symbol s
that the character xi can potentially assume. For a symbol
s ∈ Σ, the probability Q(xi=s) measures how much the event
xi=s is probable knowing all the observable characters in
x. Under this interpretation, a candidate, secure substitution
to xi is a symbol with very low Q(xi=s) (as this will lower
the joint probability of x). In particular, every symbol s s.t.
Q(xi=s) < Q(xi=xi) given x is a secure substitution for xi.
Table 1 better depicts such intuition. The Table reports the
alphabet sorted by Q(xi) for each xi in the example password
x=“PaSsW0rD!“. The bold symbols between parenthesis
indicate xi. Within this representation, all the symbols below
the respective xi for each xi are suitable substitutions capable
of improving password strength. This intuition will be
empirically proven in Section 5.2. It is important to note that
such suggestion mechanism must be randomized to avoid
promoting bias in the final password distribution.7 At this
7i.e., if weak passwords are always perturbed in the same way, these will
be easily guessed from an aware attacker.
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end, one can present to the user just k random symbols among
the pool of secure substitute i.e., {s | Q(xi=s)< Q(xi=xi)}.
In summary, in this section, we presented and motivated an
estimation process able to unravel the feedback mechanism
described in Section 3.1. Maintaining a purely theoretical fo-
cus, no information about the implementation of such method-
ology has been offered to the reader. Next, in Section 4, we
describe how such a meter can be shaped via an efficient deep
learning framework.
4 Meter implementation
In this section, we present a deep-learning-based implemen-
tation of the estimation process introduced in Section 3.2.
Here, we describe the model and its training process. Then,
we explain how the trained network can be used as a building
block for the proposed password meter.
Model training: As can be easily understood from the dis-
cussion carried out in Section 3.2, our procedure requires the
parametrization of an exponentially large number of interac-
tions among random variables. Thus, any tabular approach,
such as the one used from Markov Chains or PCFG [33],
is a priori excluded. To the purpose of making such a me-
ter feasible, then, we reformulate the underlying estimation
process so that it can be approximated with a neural net-
work. In our approach, we simulate the Markov Random
Field described in Section 3.2 using a deep convolutional
neural network trained to compute Q(xi) (Eq. 2) for each pos-
sible configuration of the structured model. In doing so, we
train our network to solve an inpainting-like task defined over
the textual domain.8 Broadly speaking, inpainting is the task
of reconstructing missing information from mangled inputs,
mostly images with missing or damaged patches [36]. A good
inpainting model must be able to infer missing content lever-
aging the context maintained from the observable data. Under
the probabilistic perspective, the model is asked to return
a probability distribution over all of the unobserved ele-
ments of x, explicitly measuring the conditional probabil-
ity of those concerning the observable context [18]. There-
fore, consequently, performing a good approximation of the
data probability distribution describing the underlying do-
main. In particular, the network has to disentangle and model
the semantic relation occurring among all the factors describ-
ing the data (e.g., pixels for the image domain or characters
in a string) to reconstruct input instances correctly.
Generally, the architecture and the training process used for
inpainting tasks resemble an auto-encoding structure. That
is, an autoencoder network [8] is trained to learn a form of
8We use the inpainting problem as a proxy-task to train our network in
describing the underlying password distribution. A similar approach is used
in [24], where a “guess the next character” problem is used as proxy-task.
x = “love1“
f (“•ove1“)
P(x1 | “•ove1“)
f (“l•ve1“)
P(x2 | “l•ve1“)
f (“lo•e1“)
P(x3 | “lo•e1“)
f (“lov•1“)
P(x4 | “lov•1“)
f (“love•“)
P(x5 | “love•“)
Figure 5: Graphical depiction of the complete inference pro-
cess for the password x=“ilove1“. The function f refers
to the trained autoencoder and the symbol ’•’ refers to the
deleted character.
reconstruction function over the interested domain. In the gen-
eral case, this kind of model is trained to revert self-induced
damage carried out on instances of a train-set X. At each
training step, an instance x ∈X is artificially mangled with an
information-destructive transformation to create a mangled
variation x˜. Then, the network, receiving x˜ as input, is opti-
mized to produce an output that most resembles the original
x; that is, the network is trained to reconstruct x from x˜.
In our approach, we train a network to infer missing characters
in a mangled password by modeling a “guess the missing char-
acter” problem. In particular, we iterate over a password leak
(i.e., our train-set) by creating mangled passwords and train
the network to recover them. The mangling operation is car-
ried out by removing a randomly selected character from the
string. For example, the train-set entry x=“iloveyou“ is trans-
formed in x˜="ilov•you" if the 5’th character is selected for
deletion, where the symbol ’•’ represents the "empty char-
acter". A compatible proxy-task has been previously used
in [26] to learn a suitable password representation for guess-
ing attacks.
We chose to model our network with a deep residual struc-
ture arranged to create an autoencoder. The network follows
the same general Context Encoder [27] architecture defined
in [26] with few modifications. The encoder and the decoder
are composed of the concatenation of the same number of
deep residual bottleneck blocks [19]. To create an information
bottleneck, the encoder connects with the decoder through a
latent space junction obtained through two fully connected
layers. Even if not strictly necessary for our purposes, we
observed that enforcing a latent space, and a prior on that,
consistently increases the meter effectiveness. For that reason,
we maintained the same regularization proposed in [26]; a
maximum mean discrepancy regularization that forces a stan-
dard normal distributed latent space. The final loss function of
our model is reported in Eq. 4. In the equation, Enc and Dec
refer to the encoder and decoder network respectively, s is the
softmax function applied row-wise9, the distance function d
is the cross-entropy, and mmd refers to the maximum mean
9The Decoder outputs ` estimations; one for each input character. There-
fore, we apply the softmax function separately on each of those to create `
probability distributions.
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discrepancy.
Ex,x˜[d(x, s(Dec(Enc(x˜)))]+αEz∼N(0,I)[mmd(z,Enc(x˜))]
(4)
Henceforth, we refer to the composition of the encoder and
the decoder as f (x) = s(Dec(Enc(x))). We train the model
on the widely studied RockYou leak [7] considering an 80/20
train-test split. From it, we filter passwords presenting fewer
than 5 characters. We train different networks considering
different maximum password lengths, namely, 16, 20, and 30.
In our experiments, we report results obtained with the model
trained on a maximum length equal to 16, as no substantial
performance variation has been observed among the different
networks. Eventually, we produce three neural nets with dif-
ferent architectures; a large network requiring 36MB of disk
space, a medium-size model requiring 18MB, and a smaller
version of the second that requires 6.6MB. These models
can be further compressed using the same quantization and
compression techniques harnessed in [24]. Fine-grained infor-
mation about the used architectures and hyper-parameters are
reported in Appendix 10. We implement our approach using
the TensorFlow framework. All the experiments have been
carried out on a Nvidia DGX-2 machine.
Model inference process: Once the model is trained, we
can use it to compute the conditional probability Q(xi) (Eq. 2)
for each i and each possible configuration of the MRF. This
is done by querying the network f using the same mangling
trick performed during the training. The procedure used to
compute Q(xi) for x summarizes in the following steps:
1. We substitute the i’th character of x with the empty char-
acter ’•’, obtaining a mangled password x˜.
2. Then, we feed x˜ to a network that outputs a probability
distribution over Σ of the unobserved random variable
xi i.e., Q(xi).
3. Given Q(xi), we marginalize out xi, obtaining the proba-
bility Q(xi) = P(xi=xi | x˜) of our interest.
For instance, if we want to compute the local conditional prob-
ability of the character ’e’ in the password x = “iloveyou“,
we first create x˜ ="ilov•you" and use it as input for the net,
obtaining Q(x5), then we marginalize that (i.e., Q(x5=’e’))
getting the probability P(x5=’e’ | x˜). From the probabilistic
point of view, this process is equivalent to fixing the observ-
able variables in the MRF and querying the model for an
estimation of the single unobserved character.
At this point, in order to cast both the feedback mechanism
defined in Section 3.1 and the Unnormalized joint probability
of the string, we have to measure Q(xi) for each character xi
of the tested password. This is easily achieved by repeating
the inference operation described above for each character
comprising the input string. A graphical representation of
such a process is depicted in Figure 5. It is important to
highlight that the ` required inferences are independent, and
their evaluation can be performed in parallel (i.e., batch
level parallelism), introducing almost negligible overhead
over the single inference. Additionally, with the use of
a feed-forward network, we are avoiding the sequential
computation that is intrinsic in recurrent networks (e.g., the
issue afflicting [24]), and that can be excessive for a reactive
client-side implementation. Furthermore, the convolutional
structure allows the construction of very deep neural nets
with a limited memory footprint.
In conclusion, leveraging the trained neural network, we
can compute the potential of each factor/vertex in the Markov
Random Field (defined as local conditional probabilities in
our construction). As a consequence, we are now able to cast
a PPSM featuring the character-level feedback mechanism
discussed in Section 3.1. Finally, in Section 5, we empirically
evaluate the soundness of the proposed meter.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we empirically validate the proposed estima-
tion process as well as its deep learning implementation. First,
in Section 5.1, we evaluate the capability of the meter of ac-
curately assessing password strength at string-level. Next, in
Section 5.2, we demonstrate the intrinsic ability of the lo-
cal conditional probabilities of being sound descriptors of
password strength at character-level.
5.1 Measuring meter accuracy
In this section, we evaluate the accuracy of the proposed
meter at estimating password probabilities. To that purpose,
following the adversarial reasoning introduced in Section 2.1,
we compare the password order imposed from the meter with
the one imposed from the ground-truth password distribution.
In doing so, we rely on the baseline defined in [17] for our
evaluation. In particular, given a test-set (i.e., a password leak),
we consider a weighted rank correlation coefficient between
ground-truth ordering and the ordering imposed from the
meter. The latter is obtained by applying the meter on each
password of the test-set and sorting those according to the
(unnormalized) joint probability. The ground-truth ordering,
instead, is obtained by sorting the unique entry of the test-set
according to the frequency of the password observed in the
leak. In the process, we compare with other fully probabilistic
meters, namely, Markov Models and the Neural approach
reported in [24]. A detailed description of the evaluation
process follows.
Test-set For modeling the ground-truth password distribu-
tion, we rely on the password leak discovered by 4iQ in the
Dark Web [1] on 5th December 2017. It consists of the ag-
gregation of ∼ 250 leaks, including well-known entries such
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as Linkedin, Myspace, and RockYou and novel breaches. In
total, the set counts 1.4 billions pair of plain-text passwords
and email addresses. In the cleaning process, we collect and
count the frequency of all the unique ASCII passwords with
length in the interval 5−16, obtaining a set of∼ 4 ·108 unique
passwords that we sort in decreasing frequency order. As it
has been previously observed in [10] and following the same
approach of [17], we filter out all the passwords with a fre-
quency lower than 10 from the test-set, as rare passwords
could bring to erroneous measurement. Finally, we obtain a
test-set composed of 107 unique passwords that we refer to
as XBC. Given both a large number of entries and the hetero-
geneity of sources composing it, we believe XBC is a good
description of real-world passwords distribution.
Tested Meters In the evaluation process, we compare our
approach with other probabilistic meters. In particular:
• The Markov model [15] implemented in [3] (the same
used in [17]). We investigate different n-grams configu-
rations, namely, 2-grams, 3-grams and 4-grams that we
refer to as MM2, MM3 and MM4 respectively. For their
training, we employ the same train-set used for our meter
(i.e., 80% RockYou with length in 5−16). Eventually,
we obtain three models MM2, MM3 and MM4 requiring
1.1MB, 94MB and 8.8GB of disk space respectively.
• The neural approach of Melicher et al. [24]. We use the
implementation available at [4] to train the main archi-
tecture advocated in [24] i.e., an RNN composed of three
LSTM layers of 1000 cells each and two fully connected
layers. The training is carried out on the same train-set
used for our meter. Eventually, we obtain a model com-
posing of 60MB of parameters that we refer to as FLA.
• Our meter. We report results from the three networks
with different sizes described in Section 4.
Metrics We follow the guidelines defined by Golla and
Dürmuth [17] in the evaluation of the meters. We use the
weighted Spearman correlation coefficient (ws) to measure
the accuracy of the orderings produced by the tested meters, as
this has been demonstrated to be the most reliable correlation
metrics within this context [17]. The metrics are defined as
ws(t,m) =
∑ni [wi(ti− t¯)(mi− m¯)]√
∑ni [wi(t− t¯i)2]∑ni [wi(m− m¯i)2]
,
where t and m are the sequence of rank assigned to the test-
set from the ground-truth distribution and the tested meter,
respectively, and where the bar notation (e.g., t¯) expresses the
weighted mean in consideration of the sequence of weights w.
The weights are computed as the normalized inverse of the
ground-truth ranks (Eq. 5).
w =
q
∑ni qi
with q =
1
t+1
. (5)
Table 2: Rank correlation coefficient computed between XBC
and the tested meters.
MM2 MM3 MM4 FLA
ours
(large)
ours
(middle)
ours
(small)
Weighted
Spearman ↑ 0.154 0.170 0.193 0.217 0.207 0.203 0.199
Required
Disk Space ↓ 1.1MB 94MB 8.8GB 60MB 36MB 18MB 6.6MB
In this application, the weights w increase the relevance of
weak passwords (i.e., the ones with small ranks) in the metrics
computation; that is, the erroneous placing of weak passwords
(i.e., asserting a weak password as strong) is highly penal-
ized. Unlike [17], we directly use the ranking imposed from
the password frequencies in XBC as ground-truth. Here, pass-
words with the same frequency value have received the same
rank.
Results Table 2 reports the measured correlation coefficient
for each tested meter. In the table, we also report the required
storage as auxiliary metric.
Our meters, even the smallest, achieve a higher score than
the most performant Markov Model i.e., MM4. On the other
hand, our largest model cannot directly exceed the accuracy of
the state-of-the-art estimator FLA, obtaining only comparable
results. However, FLA requires ∼ 70% more disk space than
ours. Indeed, interestingly, our convolutional implementation
permits the creation of remarkably lightweight meters.10 As
a matter of fact, our smallest network shows a comparable
result with MM4 requiring more than a magnitude less disk
space.
Concluding, the results confirm that the probability estimation
process defined in Section 3.2 is indeed sound and capable of
accurately assess password mass at string-level. The proposed
meter shows comparable effectiveness with the state-of-the-
art [24], whereas it outperforms standard approaches such
as Markov Chains. Nevertheless, we believe that even more
accurate estimation can be achieved by investigating deeper
architectures and/or by performing hyper-parameters tuning
over the model.
5.2 Analysis of the relation between local
conditional probabilities and password
strength
In this Section we test the capability of the proposed meter of
modeling correctly the relation between password structure
and password strength. In particular, we investigate the ability
of the measured local conditional probabilities of determining
insecure components of the tested passwords.
Our evaluation procedure follows three main steps. Starting
from a set of weak passwords X :
10Lightweight implementations are critical for the construction of suitable
client-side meters.
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1. We perform a guessing attack on X in order to estimate
the guess-number of each entry of the set.
2. For each password x ∈ X , we substitute n characters of x
according to the estimated local conditional probabilities
(i.e., we substitute the characters with highest Q(xi)),
producing a perturbed password x˜.
3. We repeat the guessing attack on the set of perturbed
passwords and measure the variation in the attributed
guess-numbers.
Hereafter, we provide a detailed description of the evaluation
procedure.
Passwords sets The evaluation is carried out considering a
set of weak passwords. In particular, we consider the first 104
most frequent passwords of the leaks collection XBC
Password perturbations In the evaluation, we consider
three types of password perturbation:
• The first acts as a baseline and consists in the substitu-
tion of random positioned characters in the passwords
with randomly selected symbols. Such general strategy
is used from [28] and [16] to improve user’s password
at composition time.11 The perturbation is applied by
randomly selecting n different characters from x and
substituting them with symbols sampled from a prede-
fined characters pool. The pool consists of the 25 most
frequent symbols in XBC (i.e., mainly lowercase letters
and digits). Restricting the character pool aims at pre-
venting the creation of artificially complex passwords
that would not be accepted as passwords by the users
(e.g., passwords containing extremely uncommon uni-
code symbols). We refer to this perturbation procedure
as Baseline.
• The second perturbation partially leverages the local
conditional probabilities induced from our meter. Given
a password x, we compute the conditional probability
Q(xi) for each character in the string. Then, we select
and substitute the character with maximum probability
i.e., argmaxxi Q(xi). The symbol we use in the substitu-
tion is randomly selected from the same pool used for
the baseline perturbation (i.e., top-25 frequent symbols).
When n is greater than one, the procedure is repeated
sequentially by using the perturbed password obtained
from the previous iteration as input for the next step. We
refer to this procedure as Semi-Meter.
• The third perturbation extends the second one by fully
exploiting the local conditional distributions. Here, as in
Semi-Meter-based, we substitute the character in x with
the highest probability. However, rather than choosing a
11 [28] also features more sophisticated variations of the random perturba-
tion aimed to ensure password usability.
Table 3: Measurements of password strength improvement
caused by different perturbations. The last two rows of the
table report the AGI ratio between the two meter-based ap-
proaches and the baseline.
n = 1 n = 2 n = 3
Baseline (PNP) 0.022 0.351 0.549
Semi-Meter (PNP) 0.036 0.501 0.674
Fully-Meter (PNP) 0.066 0.755 0.884
Baseline (AGI) 3.0 ·1010 3.6 ·1011 5.6 ·1011
Semi-Meter (AGI) 4.6 ·1010 5.1 ·1011 6.8 ·1011
Fully-Meter (AGI) 8.2 ·1010 7.7 ·1011 8.9 ·1011
Semi-Meter / Baseline (AGI) 1.530 1.413 1.222
Fully-Meter / Baseline (AGI) 2.768 2.110 1.588
substitute symbol in the pool at random, we select that
basing the distribution Q(xi), where i is the position of
the character to be substituted. In particular, we choose
the symbol the minimize Q(xi) i.e., argmins∈Σ′Q(xi=s),
where Σ′ is the allowed pool of symbols. We refer to this
method as Fully-Meter. Examples of perturbed pass-
words are reported in the Appendix.
Guessing Attack We evaluate password strength using the
min-guess metrics described in [31]. Here, guessing attacks
are simultaneously performed with different guessing tools,
and the guess-number of a password is considered as the
minimum among the attributed guess-numbers. In performing
such attacks, we rely on the combination of three widely
adopted solutions, namely, HashCat [2], PCFG [6, 33] and
the Markov chain approach proposed in [5, 15]. For tools
requiring a training phase i.e., OMEN and PCFG, we use
the same train-set used for our model (i.e., 80% of RockYou).
In a similar way, for HashCat, we use the same data set as
input dictionary12 and generated2 as rules set. During the
guesses generation, we maintain the default settings of each
implementation. We limit each tool to produce 1011 guesses.
The total size of the generated guesses is ∼ 3TB.
Metrics In the evaluation, we are interested at measuring
the increment of password strength caused from an applied
perturbation. We estimate that value by considering the Aver-
age Guess-number Increment (henceforth, referred as AGI);
that is, the average delta between the guess-number of the
original password and the guess-number of the perturbed pass-
word:
AGI(X) =
1
|X |
|X |
∑
i=0
[g(x˜i)−g(xi)] ,
where g is the guess-number and x˜i refers to the perturbed
version of the i’th password in the test set. During the com-
putation of the guess-numbers, it is possible that we fail at
assign a guess-number to a password (i.e., we do not guess
12In this case, passwords are unique and sorted in decreasing frequency.
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it). In these cases, we attribute an artificial guess-number
equals to 1012 to the un-guessed passwords. Additionally, we
consider the average number of un-guessed passwords as an
ancillary metrics; we refer to it with the name of Percentage
Non-Guessed Passwords (PNP) and compute it as:
PNP(X) =
1
|X | |{x
i | g(xi) 6=⊥ ∧ g(x˜i) =⊥}| ,
where g(x) = ⊥ when x is not guessed during the guessing
attack.
Results We perform the tests over three value of n
(i.e., number of perturbed characters), namely, 1, 2, and 3. Re-
sults are summarized in Table 3. The AGI caused by the two
meter-based solutions is always greater than that produced by
random perturbations. On average, that is twice more effec-
tive with respect to the baseline for the Fully-Meter and about
35% greater for the Semi-Meter. The largest relative benefit
is observable when n = 1, i.e., a single character is modified.
Focusing on the Fully-Meter approach, indeed, the guidance
of the local conditional probabilities permits a guess-number
increment 2.7 times bigger than the one caused by a random
substitution in the string. This advantage drops to∼ 1.5 when
n = 3, since, after two perturbations, passwords tend to be
already out from the dense zone of the distribution. Indeed, at
n = 3 about 88% of the passwords perturbed with the Fully-
Meter approach cannot be guessed during the guessing attack
(i.e., PNP). This value is only ∼ 55% for the baseline. More
interestingly, the results tell us that substituting two (n = 2)
characters following the guide of the local conditional prob-
abilities causes a guess-number increment greater than the
one obtained from three (n = 3) random perturbations. As
a matter of fact, the AGI for the Fully-Meter perturbation is
∼ 7.6 ·1011 for n = 2 whereas is ∼ 5.7 ·1011 for the baseline
when n = 3.
Eventually, these results confirm that the local conditional dis-
tributions are indeed sound descriptors of password security
at the structural level.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that it is possible to construct in-
terpretable probabilistic password meters by fundamentally
rethinking the underlying password mass estimation. We pre-
sented an undirected probabilistic interpretation of the pass-
word generative process that can be used to build precise
and sound password feedback mechanisms. Moreover, we
demonstrated that such an estimation process could be in-
stantiated via a lightweight deep learning implementation.
We validated our undirected description and deep learning
solution by showing that our meter achieves comparable accu-
racy with other existing approaches while providing a unique
character-level feedback mechanism.
Availability
The code, pre-trained models, and other materials related to
our work are publicly available at: https://github.com/
pasquini-dario/InterpretablePPSM/.
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7 Appendix
8 Details on the probabilistic interpretation
The Hammersley-Clifford’s theorem asserts that the joint
probability distribution of a set of random variables described
by an undirected model with graph G can be represented as
the product of non-negative factors (or potential function),
one for maximal clique of G:
P(x) =
1
Z ∏c∈C
ψ(xc) with Z =∑
x
∏
c∈C
ψ(xc) . (6)
where C is the set of maximal cliques in G and the notation xc
outlines the set of variables composing a clique c ∈C. Being
our graph complete, we have just one maximal clique that
covers all the nodes in the graph, therefore, there is a single
term in the productory of Eq. 6. In our construction, we define
the potential function ψ to be a non-linear function of the
parameters of the neural network. In particular, the product
of the local conditional probability of each character Q(xi)
(with Q given in Eq. 2); that is:
P(x) =
1
Z
ψ(x1, . . . ,x`) =
1
Z
`
∏
i=1
Q(xi) . (7)
However, it is important to note that the potential function
does not have a natural probabilistic interpretation per se, as
this is intended to represent a measure of relative compat-
ibility among the involved random variables. Nevertheless,
we imply such interpretation through our construction. Ad-
ditionally, being ψ product of probabilities, we ensure ψ to
be non-negative as required from the Hammersley-Clifford’s
theorem.
9 Estimating guess-numbers
Within the context of PPSMs, a common solution to approxi-
mate guess-numbers [23] is using the Monte Carlo method
proposed in [14]. With few adjustments, the same approach
can be applied to our meter. In particular, we have to find
out an approximation of the partition function Z. This can be
done by leveraging on the Monte Carlo method, as well. For
instance, we can estimate the partition function Z as follows:
Z ' N ·Ex[P(x)] (8)
where N is the number of possible configurations of the MRF
(i.e., the cardinality of the key-space) and x is a sample from
the posterior of the model. Samples from the model can be
obtained in three ways: (1) sampling from the latent space
of the autoencoder (as done in [26]), (2) performing Gibbs
sampling from the autoencoder, or (3) using a dataset of pass-
words that follow the same distribution of the model. Once
we have an approximation of Z, we can use it to normalize
every joint probability i.e., P(x) = P˜(x)Z and seamlessly ap-
ply [14]. Alternatively, a more articulate solution can be used
in substitution of Eq. 8 like in [22].
It is important to note that the estimation Z is performed of-
fline and must be computed only once for the lifespan of the
meter.
10 Model Architectures and hyper-
parameters
In this section we detail the technical aspects of our deep
learning implementation.
Architectures As previously described, we base our net-
works on a resnet structure. We use bottleneck residual block
composed of three mono-dimensional convolutional layers
as atomic building block of the networks. A graphical de-
scription of that is depicted in Figure 6. We construct three
different networks with different sizes (intended as number of
trainable parameters). We determine the size of the networks
by varying the number of residual blocks, the kernel size of
the convolutional layers in the blocks and the number of fil-
ters. The three architectures are reported in Tables 5, 6 and
7.
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INPUT:	num_layers=ls
Bacth	Normalization
RelU conv1D:	num_layers=ls/2;	kernel_size=b
Bacth	Normalization
RelU conv1D:	num_layers=ls/2;	kernel_size=a
Bacth	Normalization
RelU conv1D:	num_layers=ls;	kernel_size=b
+
Figure 6: Depiction of: ResblockBneck1D[fn=ls, ks=(a,b)]
Table 4: Hyper-parameters used to train our AE
Hyper-parameter Value
α 10
Batch size 3024
Learning rate 0.0001
Optimizer Adam
Train Epochs
small=10
medium=5
large=5
ε 0.05
Training process Table 4 reports the used hyper-
parameters. During the training, we apply label smoothing
which is controlled from the parameter ε. We found our mod-
els taking particular advantage from large batch-sizes. We
limit that to 3072 for technical limitations, however, we be-
lieve that bigger batches could further increment the quality
of the password estimation.
11 Supplementary resources
This Section reports additional resources useful to the
understanding of our contribute.
Table 8 reports examples of password perturbation performed
using the method Fully-meter on the three values of n. The
example passwords (first column) are sampled from XBC.
Figure 7 reports additional examples of the feedback
mechanism. The depicted passwords have been randomly
sampled from the tail of the RockYou leak. The inner figures
are sorted based on the joint probability assigned from the
meter.
Table 5: Small architecture.
cov1d[3, 128, same, linear]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=128, ks=(3,1)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=128, ks=(3,1)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=128, ks=(3,1)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=128, ks=(3,1)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=128, ks=(3,1)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=128, ks=(3,1)]
Flatten
FullyConnected[128, linear]
FullyConnected[MaxPasswordLength ·128, linear]
Reshape[MaxPasswordLength, 128]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=128, ks=(3,1)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=128, ks=(3,1)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=128, ks=(3,1)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=128, ks=(3,1)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=128, ks=(3,1)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=128, ks=(3,1)]
Flatten
FullyConnected[MaxPasswordLength ·AlphabetCardinality, linear]
Table 6: Medium architecture.
cov1d[5, 128, same, linear]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=128, ks=(5,3)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=128, ks=(5,3)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=128, ks=(5,3)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=128, ks=(5,3)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=128, ks=(5,3)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=128, ks=(5,3)]
Flatten
FullyConnected[80, linear]
FullyConnected[MaxPasswordLength ·128, linear]
Reshape[MaxPasswordLength, 128]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=128, ks=(5,3)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=128, ks=(5,3)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=128, ks=(5,3)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=128, ks=(5,3)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=128, ks=(5,3)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=128, ks=(5,3)]
Flatten
FullyConnected[MaxPasswordLength ·AlphabetCardinality, linear]
Table 7: Large architecture.
cov1d[5, 128, same, linear]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=200, ks=(5,3)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=200, ks=(5,3)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=200, ks=(5,3)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=200, ks=(5,3)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=200, ks=(5,3)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=200, ks=(5,3)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=200, ks=(5,3)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=200, ks=(5,3)]
Flatten
FullyConnected[80, linear]
FullyConnected[MaxPasswordLength ·128, linear]
Reshape[MaxPasswordLength, 128]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=200, ks=(5,3)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=200, ks=(5,3)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=200, ks=(5,3)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=200, ks=(5,3)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=200, ks=(5,3)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=200, ks=(5,3)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=200, ks=(5,3)]
ResblockBneck1D[fn=200, ks=(5,3)] Flatten
FullyConnected[MaxPasswordLength ·AlphabetCardinality, linear]
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Table 8: Examples of password perturbation performed us-
ing the method Fully-meter. Symbols in bold are the ones
substituted by the meter.
x n=1 n=2 n=3
heaven7 2eaven7 2eav1n7 2e9v1n7
corvette corvltte c5rvltte c5rvlttb
mariah m3riah m3uiah u3uiah
373737 37373l t7373l t737ul
veronica1 vsronica1 vsron5ca1 vsrsn5ca1
ariana1 ariaoa1 3riaoa1 3r6aoa1
goodgirl goodgir3 g9odgir3 u9odgir3
cheer c9eer c9ehr c9yhr
mahalko mlhalko mlh8lko mlh8lkt
19981998 19981n98 u9981n98 u9o81n98
123456aa i23456aa i234r6aa i23nr6aa
helena heleaa h4leaa h4ieaa
montana1 monta2a1 mo3ta2a1 mo3aa2a1
vancouver vancouvmr va9couvmr va9co6vmr
fuck12 fhck12 fhck1n fhc81n
patriots1 pat9iots1 pat9ioti1 p5t9ioti1
evelyn1 eve4yn1 6ve4yn1 6ve4ynr
pancho panc2o pa6c2o 9a6c2o
malibu m5libu m5yibu m5yib6
ilovemysel ilo0emysel iio0emysel iio0emys8l
galatasaray galatasar4y galat6sar4y g8lat6sar4y
tootsie1 to5tsie1 to5ts9e1 to5tn9e1
sayangku saya8gku s3ya8gku s3ya8gk8
moneyman mo5eyman mo5eymdn uo5eymdn
theboss th9boss th9bos4 th9bts4
112211 o12211 o1221u oe221u
k12345 k123y5 k12oy5 kn2oy5
alexis 9lexis 9lrxis 9lrxos
princess7 princ4ss7 prihc4ss7 prrhc4ss7
rooster1 roo3ter1 roo3tlr1 r6o3tlr1
june15 junm15 junmr5 jlnmr5
samurai1 0amurai1 0amu0ai1 0emu0ai1
surfer1 s9rfer1 s9rfnr1 s9rfnr3
lokomotiv lhkomotiv lhkomot6v lhko8ot6v
rfn.irf rfn.i5f 5fn.i5f 5en.i5f
melisa mtlisa mtlisl mtl6sl
minime 3inime 3inimt 3iiimt
peaceout peaaeout 8eaaeout 8eaaeo1t
louise lo4ise lr4ise lr4isr
Liverpool Livehpool Livehp2ol Li6ehp2ol
147896 1d7896 1d78y6 1d78yy
aditya adltya 4dltya 4dltyi
qwerty13 qwmrty13 qwmr9y13 qwmr9yu3
070809 i70809 i708d9 i7r8d9
emmanuel1 emm9nuel1 emm9nuei1 e0m9nuei1
beautiful2 be1utiful2 be1utif1l2 be1utnf1l2
Figure 7: Additional examples of the feedback mechanism.
f o x x y 1 0 1
c o w b o y 2 2
j o s h 1 2 2 9
b r a v o 2 1 3
1 4 3 j u s t o
m e g 4 5 6 7 8
C a r b o n 0 6
c h e y b e b e
p i m p c 3 s s
c r u s h s r b
o d b a l l e t
6 2 2 9 5 7 5 6
q f u c k 0 0 7
h a z - 4 - ? ?
b l u 2 6 s k y
n a b z _ 0 0 7
c h a h b h 4 4
4 o r d g i r l
3 0 2 5 4 1 a y
3 x p o s u r e
W H ^ T E V E R
l f c 5 3 g s e
. p r e c o z .
k w i k 2 s p l
m a 8 i m a t a
b e t o  f . a
g 4 b r 1 3 l 4
s * e * 7 * 1 1
2 g e e h g f e
m a 9 1 t 1 h 6
C g L 1 2 c G v
# u y n h h o a
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